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INTRODUCTION

Serving on a hospital credentials committee was once a privilege.
That privilege has now become a hazard. Following the Supreme
Court's decision in Patrick v. Burget,' physicians are questioning
whether they want to assume the potential litigation risks inherent
in serving on a credentials committee. For the first time, liability
insurers are inquiring into physicians' peer review committee activities.

* D.V.M., 1967, Texas A & M University; M.D., 1973, University of Texas; J.D. Candidate,
South Texas College of Law. The author wishes to thank Professor Catherine G. Burnett, South
Texas College of Law.
1. 486 U.S. 904, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988).
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Physicians face a new threat in the medical malpractice litigation
arena - M.D. v. HospitalPeerReview Committee. Anytime a medical
peer review committee either denies an applying physician staff
privileges or revokes a physician's current clinical privileges, some
sort of legal hearings or actual litigation under the Sherman Antitrust
Act 2 or other doctrines 3 almost inevitably ensues.
The damages awarded in such legal actions can be substantial.
When compared to a malpractice suit, a restraint of trade action can
be more formidable for two reasons. First, an antitrust action is not
covered under the usual liability insurance policy since antitrust has
nothing to do with the "practice" of medicine in a negligent manner.
Second, successful plaintiffs can obtain substantial damages for antitrust violations. The potentially staggering measure of liability is three
times the physician's earning power loss resulting from the hospital
privileges denial.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Patrick v. Burget,
addressed the antitrust peer review liability issue. 4 Affirming a lower
court judgment of 2.2 million dollars, the Patrick Court ruled in favor
of a physician whose clinical privileges were revoked by a credentials
committee. 5 Although Patrick presented several issues on appeal,6 the
main question was whether federal antitrust rules prevailed over the
state medical peer review immunity statute's protection of peer review
committee members. 7 Focusing narrowly on the antitrust issue, s the
Court failed to establish standards for medical peer review immunity.
The American Medical Association (AMA) and the Joint Commission of Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAH) filed amicus
briefs on behalf of the peer review committee defendants in the case.
The AMA sought to convince the Court that its decision did little to
resolve the broader peer review liability issues. 9 Justice Marshall,
writing for the Court, noted that Congress had declined to exempt

2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
3. See infra notes 16, 186, 270 and accompanying text.
4. 108 S. Ct. at 1662.
5. Id. at 1666.
6. The Court of Appeals, despite the finding "that evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to Patrick, revealed shabby, unprincipled, and unprofessional conduct on the part of
the defendants" reversed on the ground that respondents' conduct was immune from antitrust
scrutiny under the state action doctrine of Parker v. Brown and its progeny. 800 F.2d 1498,
1509 (9th Cir. 1986).
7. 108 S. Ct. at 1662.
8. Id. at 1659 (state action doctrine does not protect Oregon physicians from federal antitrust
liability for their activities on hospital peer review committees).
9. Id. at 1665.
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medical peer review from the reach of the antitrust laws.10 The Court
explained that physicians desiring greater protection from antitrust
challenges to peer review must address their concerns to Congress."
What appeared to be a relatively settled issue dealing with the
Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA) 12 in the spring of
1988 became a red hot topic in the summer of 1988 when the Court
decided Patrick. Until all the fundamental considerations of medical
peer review immunity have been addressed and defined in a way that
is consistent with state and federal statutes and previous case law,
physicians who choose to serve on medical peer review committees
may do so at great risk of liability under the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Consequently, hospitals which are required by state law to periodically
review the medical practice of its staff physicians (by medical review
committees comprised of physicians) are anxious to have the matter
resolved. Although the JCAH can mandate peer review as a condition
for hospital accreditation and receipt of federal funds, it cannot compel
physicians to serve on committees. With no immunity, physicians are
reluctant to assume litigation risks in order to satisfy a governmental
regulatory agency.
A hospital credentials committee is unlikely to limit or deny
privileges to a member of a hospital staff based solely upon its concern
about an antitrust violation. However, the committee exercising peer
review should consider the antitrust ramifications of its staff privileges
decisions. A basic knowledge of the committee's available defenses to
an antitrust challenge will aid the committee in evaluating its peer
1
review decisions. 3
II.

STATE ACTION DOCTRINE

14
Patrick addressed the issue of whether the state action doctrine
protects physicians in the State of Oregon from federal antitrust liability for their activities on hospital peer review committees.15 The
state action doctrine, defined in Parker v. Brown,16 exempts from

10. Id. at 1665 n.8. Congress insulated certain medical peer review activities from antitrust
liability in the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-52 (Supp.
1987). The Act, which was enacted well after the events at issue in this case and is not
retroactive, immunizes peer review action from liability if the action was taken in the reasonable
belief that it was in the furtherance of quality care.
11.

Id.

12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-52 (Supp. 1987).
13. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
15. Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658, 1662 (1988).
16. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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antitrust liability acts by the state or actions that bear a close relationship to state power or authority. 17 In Parker, the Supreme Court,
relying on principles of federalism and state sovereignty, held that
Congress did not intend the Sherman Act to prohibit states from
imposing restraints on competition. 18 The state, in Parker, established
a private raisin producers cartel designed to stabilize prices and increase economic efficiency in the raisin industry. 19 Although the scheme
reduced competition among raisin producers, the Court determined
that in passing the Sherman Act, Congress did not intend to prevent
states from regulating their domestic commerce. 20 The critical issue
was whether Congress, in enacting the Sherman Act, had intended
to occupy the field of state-sanctioned anticompetitive activity.21 The
Supreme Court concluded that Congress had not, and thus the state's
legislative interests had to be accommodated.- While the defendant
in Parker was a state official, the Supreme Court has also applied the
Parker doctrine to suits against private parties who implement state
policies.?
In the years following Parker, the Supreme Court has narrowed
the scope of the state action doctrine. The legislative actions of a state
legislature and the "legislative" decisions of a state supreme court are
state actions exempt from antitrust liability.- However, anticompetitive activity not directly that of the state legislature or state supreme
court, but carried out by others pursuant to state authorization,2

17. Id. at 350.
18. Id. at 353.
19. Id. at 346.
20. Id. at 352.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48
(1985). Private carriers formed a rate bureau that submitted joint proposals on rates to state
regulatory agencies. The Supreme Court held that the activity was immune from antitrust
attack, reasoning that Parkerdid not require compulsion because it was an attempt to reconcile
state displacement with federal antitrust goals.
24. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567-68 (1984) (state supreme court that denied unsuccessful applicant to state bar exempt from antitrust action under the Parker doctrine because
the challenged conduct was that of the State itself) (citing Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433
U.S. 350, 360 (1977)).
25. Typically, a state legislature enacts a "medical practice act" creating a regulatory agency
which, in turn, promulgates rules governing the examination and licensure of physicians. Generally, members of the "board of medical examiners" are largely comprised of physicians who
are actively engaged in the private practice of medicine.
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requires "closer analysis" to determine whether it is attributable to
the state and thus an immune state action.26
Any attempt to invoke the Parker state action immunity doctrine
must surmount the strong federal interest in maintaining unrestrained
competition. Congress enacted the Sherman Act pursuant to its power
under the commerce clause, 27 and the Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance of the Act's procompetitive policy. 2 The federal
antitrust laws preempt state laws authorizing or compelling private
29
parties to engage in anticompetitive behavior.
The Supreme Court articulated the circumstances under which
Parker immunity is available to private parties in California Retail
Liquor DealersAssociation v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.30 The California
statute at issue in Midcal required all wine producers and wholesalers
to file fair trade contracts and price schedules with the state.3 1 If a
producer failed to set prices by contract, the wholesalers were required
to post a resale price schedule.2 All wine had to be sold at the prices
set by contract or by price schedule. 3 Defendant Midcal was a wine
producer charged with selling wine at a price below that set by a
producer's price schedule.- Midcal petitioned the state court for an
injunction against the California Department of Alcoholic Control,
acknowledging that under the challenged system, the state could fine
Midcal or suspend its license. 3 The Court held that because the state
neither established prices nor regulated the terms of the fair trade
contracts or price schedules, but merely authorized and enforced the
private parties' price fixing, the California statutory scheme did not
satisfy the requirements of the state action doctrine.36

26. Hoover, 466 U.S. at 568; Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498, 1505 (9th Cir. 1986). See
also Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 359-63 (1977) (state supreme court rule that
restricted advertising by lawyers is act of the state). Contra Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
421 U.S. 773, 775, 793 (1975) (enforcement by state bar of county bar's minimum fee schedule
for lawyers is not act of state).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
28. California Retail Liquor Dealers Assoc. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110-11
(1980).
29. 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 n.8 (1987).
30. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
31. Id. at 99.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 100.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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The Supreme Court, in Midcal, fashioned a two-pronged test to
determine whether state regulation of private parties is immune from
antitrust liability. First, the anticompetitive conduct must be undertaken pursuant to a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
policy of the state" to displace competition.3 7 Second, the state must
actively supervise any private anticompetitive conduct.a Only if an
anticompetitive act of a private party meets both of these requirements
is it fairly attributable to the state.3 9 The state scheme in Midcal
40
failed the active state supervision prong of the test.
This test is applicable to private parties as well as state officials.41
When a state acts in its sovereign capacity, the two-pronged Midcal
42
test is inapplicable; the act is simply immune from antitrust laws.
But when the anticompetitive activity is carried out by private parties
pursuant to state authorization, which includes authorization by a state
agency, both prongs of the Midcal test must be satisfied. 43 Satisfying
both parts of the test demonstrates that the state intended anticompetitive conduct as part of its regulatory scheme.A.

The Second Prong: Active Supervision by the State

The Patrick Court turned to the second prong of the Midcal test
and attempted to define what constitutes active state supervision for
medical peer review committees. 4 5 Justice Marshall, writing for a
unanimous Court, noted that the issue presented was whether the
Parkerv. Brown state action doctrine protects Oregon physicians from
federal antitrust liability for their activities on hospital peer review
committees. 46 The Court did not consider the "clear articulation" prong
of the Midcal test because it found that the "active supervision" re7
quirement had not been satisfied.4

37. Id. at 105.
38. Id.
39. Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658, 1663 (1988).
40. Id.
41. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 56-57
(1985).
42. Consolidated Gas Co. v. City Gas Co., 665 F. Supp. 1493, 1524 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
43. Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 60-63.
44. Id. at 65-66 (state public service commissions, permitted by statute in three states and
permitted pursuant to clearly articulated state policy in fourth state, immune from antitrust
laws). Contra Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. at 105-06 (although legislative policy clearly articulated, the program was not immune from antitrust laws due to inadequate state supervision).
45. Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988).
46. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
47. Patrick, 108 S. Ct. at 1668.
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The Midcal test recognizes that a private party engaging in anticompetitive conduct could be acting to further his own interests, rather
than the governmental interests of the state. '" The requirement of
active state supervision in the second prong of the test ensures that
the state action doctrine will shelter only the particular anticompetitive
acts of private parties that, in the judgment of the state, actually
further state regulatory policies. 49 To accomplish this purpose, the
active supervision requirement mandates that the state exercise ultimate control over the challenged anticompetitive conduct.- The mere
presence of some state involvement or monitoring does not suffice.51
The active supervision prong of the Midcal test requires that state
officials have and exercise power to review particular anticompetitive
acts of private parties and disapprove those that fail to be consistent
with state policy.52 Absent such a program of supervision, there is no
realistic assurance that a private party's anti-competitive conduct promotes state policy. 3
In Patrick, the petitioner was a surgeon who declined an invitation
by respondents to join them as a partner in their clinic.- Instead, he
began an independent practice in competition with the clinic. 55 Following difficulties in his professional dealings with the clinic, the hospital
peer review committee terminated petitioner's privileges at the town's
only hospital.- The committee suspended petitioner's clinical privileges
57
on the ground that his patient care was below hospital standards.
Petitioner filed suit in federal district court, alleging that respondents had violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.5 The complaint

48. Id. at 1663 (quoting Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985)).
49. Id.
50. Id. (citing Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S.
48, 51 (1985)) (noting that state public service commissions have and exercise ultimate authority
and control over all intrastate rates).
51. See 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 345 n.7 (1987) (holding that certain forms
of state scrutiny of a restraint established by a private party did not constitute active supervision
because they did not exert any significant control over the terms of the restraint).
52. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Assoc. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
105 (1980).
53. Tambone v. Memorial Hosp. for McHenry County, 635 F. Supp. 508, 514-15 (N.D. Ill.
1986), affd, 825 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir. 1987) (physician who was denied staff privileges at hospital
brought antitrust action against hospital and hospital peer review committee members).
54. Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658, 1660 (1988).
.55. Id.
56. Id. at 1661 (majority of the hospital's staff members were employees or partners of the
clinic).
57. Id.
58. Id.
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alleged that respondents initiated and participated in the peer review
proceedings in order to reduce competition rather than to improve
patient care. 59 The court entered a judgment against respondents, but
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.- Despite finding that
the evidence "viewed in the light more favorable to Patrick, revealed
shabby, unprincipled and unprofessional conduct on the part of the
defendants," the court of appeals held that respondents' conduct was
immune from antitrust scrutiny under the state action doctrine of
Parker.6 1 The appellate court reasoned that Oregon had articulated a
policy in favor of peer review and actively supervised the peer review
process.62 Thus, both the clearly articulated state policy and active
state supervision prongs of the Parker test were satisfied.
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation of "active supervision. '"- The Court held that the state
action doctrine did not protect peer review decisions in Oregon because
no state actor in Oregon actively supervised hospital peer review
decision.6
The state health agency in Oregon, the Health Division, has general
supervisory powers over matters relating to the preservation of life
and health,- including licensing hospitals- and enforcing health laws.67
Hospitals in Oregon have a statutory obligation to establish peer review procedures and to review those procedures regularly.6 Under
its enforcement powers, the state Health Division, may initiate judicial
proceedings against any hospital violating this law.69 In addition, the
Health Division may deny, suspend or revoke a hospital's license for
failing to comply with statutory requirements.70 Oregon law specifies
no other ways in which the Health Division may supervise the peer
review process.
This statutory scheme does not provide active state supervision
over peer review decisions.71 Patrick established that merely mandat-

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498, 1509 (9th Cir. 1986).
Patrick, 108 S. Ct. at 1663.
Id.
Id. at 1664.
OR. REV. STAT. § 431.110(1) (1987).
Id. at § 441.025.
See id. at §§ 431.120(1), .150, .155(1).
See id.at § 441.055(3)(c), (d).
See id. at §§ 431.150, .155.
Id. at § 441.030(2).
Patrick, 108 S. Ct. at 1664.
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ing medical peer review without actively taking part in that review
process is not active supervision.7 2 Actively taking part in the review
process, under Patrick, means that a state official exercises ultimate
authority over private privilege decisions. 73 Since the Oregon Health
Division has no power to overturn private peer review decisions that
are inconsistent with state policy, the activities of the Health Division
cannot satisfy the active supervision requirement of the state action
74
doctrine.
Nor does the Oregon Board of Medical Examiners (BOME) actively
supervise private peer review decisions. Its principal function is to
regulate the licensing of physicians in the state. 75 Although Oregon
hospitals are required by statute to notify the BOME promptly of a
decision to terminate or restrict privileges, the statutory provision
does not indicate that the BOME can overturn private privilege decisions. 76 The reporting requirement merely gives the BOME an opportunity to determine whether additional action on its part, such as
revocation of a physician's license, is warranted.- In Patrick, respondents did not show that the BOME actually reviewed privilege decisions or that it had ever asserted the authority to reverse those deci78
sions.
Although the case did not require the Court to decide the broad
question of whether judicial review of private conduct can ever constitute active state supervision, the Patrick Court did discuss the judicial
review system in Oregon. 79 Previous Supreme Court cases concerning
state supervision over private parties have involved administrative
agencies8° or state supreme courts with agency-like responsibilities
over the organized bar.sl Oregon has no statute expressly providing

72. Id.
73. Id. See also n.6. The statutory scheme indicates that the Health Division has only
limited power over even a hospital's peer review procedures. The statute authorizes the Health
Division to force a hospital to comply with its obligation to establish and regularly review peer
review procedures, but the statute does not empower the Health Division to review the quality
of the procedures that the hospital adopts. Id.
74. Id.
75. See OR. REV. STAT. § 441.820(1) (1987).
76. See id. at § 441.820(1).
77. 108 S. Ct. at 1664 n.7. The statutory provision requiring hospitals to inform the BOME
of a decision to terminate privileges in only one of several statutory reporting requirements
involving the Board of Medical Examiners. Oregon law also provides that hospitals and licenses
shall report medically incompetent conduct to the BOME. Id. See also OR. REV. STAT. § 743.770.
78. 108 S. Ct. at 1664 n.7.
79. Id. at 1664-65.
80. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
81. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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for judicial review of privilege terminations8 2 The Oregon Supreme
Court, in its most recent decision on the subject, stated that a court
"should [not] decide the merits of plaintiffs dismissal," and that "[i]t
would be unwise for a court to do more than to make sure that some
sort of reasonable procedure was afforded and that there was evidence
from which it could be found that plaintiffs conduct posed a threat
to patient care."- Under the Oregon Supreme Court's standard, a
state court would not review the merits of a privilege termination
decision to determine whether it was consistent with state regulatory
activity.8 The Ninth Circuit found that such limited review did not
convert a private party's act of terminating a physician's privileges
into state action.85
The Supreme Court in Patrick left open the question of whether
judicial review in the context of a traditional lawsuit may constitute
active state supervision.8 Three months after the Patrick decision, in
Bolt v. Halifax Hospital Medical Center,8 7 the Eleventh Circuit accepted the implied invitation by the Patrick Court and used judicial
review to satisfy the requirement of active state supervision in a
Florida case involving a medical peer review committee. 8 Bolt is particularly significant in that it may provide a mechanism for legislatures
to impose, and for courts to continue, active state supervision.
In Bolt, a physician, whose staff privileges were revoked at each
of three hospitals, brought suit against the hospitals and their medical
staffs. 9 The issue was whether the state of Florida actively supervised
peer review. 90 The Eleventh Circuit relied on Patrick,which held that
"the State does not actively supervise the termination of hospital staff
privileges unless a state official exercises ultimate authority over private privilege determinations."' 91 The Eleventh Circuit held that the

82. Some states may follow the Texas statute which provides for judicial review in a state
district court only for suspension or revocation of the medical license and not for loss of clinical
privileges. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b(4.09) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
83. 108 S. Ct. at 1665 (quoting Straube v. Emmanuel Lutherian Charity Bd., 600 P.2d 381,
386 (Or. 1979)).
84. Only seven states fail to follow this approach: New Jersey, Arizona, California, Hawaii,
New Hampshire, Vermont, and New Mexico. See Note, Michigan Court Joins Majority in
Denying Judicial Review of Staffing Decisions of Private Hospitals, 6 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
339 (1982).
85. Id.
86. 108 S. Ct. at 1665.
87. 851 F.2d 1273 (11th Cir. 1988).
88. Id. at 1274.
89. Id. at 1273-74.
90. Id. at 1274, 1281.
91. Id. at 1281 (quoting Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658, 1664 (1988)).

MEDICAL PEER REVIEW IMMUNITY

1988-1989]

Florida peer review statute9 failed to indicate that Florida's BOME had

power to overturn a peer review decision. 93 The court reasoned that
the apparent purpose of the notification requirement was to enable
the BOME to take further disciplinary action if it deemed such further
action appropriate. 9
The Eleventh Circuit then concluded that judicial review may constitute active state supervision for purposes of the state action exemption. 95 Although not authorized by the legislature, judicial review is
nonetheless state regulation.
It is sufficient if the legislature clearly articulates a policy
and then acquiesces in the courts' implementation of that
policy .

.

.

Indeed, regulation through the judiciary may

be more likely to ensure accurate implementation of the
state's, policy, for courts are especially well suited to divine,
interpret, and enforce legislative policy.After entering the door opened by Patrick, the Eleventh Circuit
reviewed time-tested case history that reaffirmed the courts' competency to scrutinize medical peer review cases.Y
[J]udicial review cannot constitute active state supervision
unless it is available on an established basis and is of a
sufficiently probing nature. To be sufficiently probing, the
scope of judicial review must first of all encompass the fairness of the procedures used in reaching the decision. Furthermore, it must involve consideration of whether the
criteria used by the decisionmakers were consistent with
state policy and whether the decision had a sufficient basis
in fact.
Upon examining both Florida case law and Florida statutes, the
court determined that such judicial review was available in the state.99
For example, Florida courts have recognized that a physician whose

92. Id. Defendants asserted that Florida actively supervised peer review determinations
by virtue of Fla. Stat. § 458.337(1)(b) (1981), which requires notification of the Florida Board
of Medical Examiners, a state agency, whenever a physician "[h]as been disciplined . . . by a
licensed hospital or medical staff of said hospital." Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1281-82.
95. Id. at 1282.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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staff privileges at a hospital have been revoked has a cause of action
for injunctive relief. °0 Florida hospitals are required by statute to
establish rules for granting and terminating staff privileges. 101 Such
rules ensure that hospitals base review decisions on fair procedures,
valid criteria, and sufficient evidence. The courts enforce the rules by
2
granting injunctive relief against the hospital.10
The Eleventh Circuit's decision has greatly expanded the definition
of active state supervision in the context of medical peer review decisions. Judicial review of medical staff decisions is sufficiently probing
to constitute active state supervision if the courts review (1) the fairness of the procedures, (2) the validity of the criteria used, and (3)
the sufficiency of the evidence.16 The Fifth Circuit described the limits
of court review: "In short, so long as staff selections are administered
with fairness, gauged by a rationale compatible with hospital responsibility, and unencumbered with irrelevant considerations, a court
should not interfere."104
Several cases have addressed the issue of adequate supervision.
In Midcal Aluminum v. Rice, where the state simply enforced the
prices established by private parties, the court held that this did not
meet the requirement of active supervision.105 The district court in
Coin Call, Inc. v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.'- found,
however, that where the defendant initiated a coin telephone tariff,
the action met the second prong of CaliforniaRetail Liquor Dealers
Association v. Midcal Aluminum Inc. because a state agency actively
enforced the original tariff and participated in its revision.- °
In the pre-Patrick case of Quinn v. Kent General Hospital,108 the
court also considered the issue of peer review immunity under the

100. See, eg., Margolin v. Morton F. Plant Hosp. Ass'n, 348 So. 2d 57, 57 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.
1977); see also Lawler v. Eugene Westhoff Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 497 So. 2d 1261, 1263-64
(Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1986); Palm Beach-Martin County Medical Center, Inc. v. Panaro, 431 So. 2d
1023, 1024-25 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983).
101. FLA. STAT. § 395.0653(3) (1981).
102. Bolt, 851 F.2d at 1284 n.15. Florida courts have recognized this cause of action for
injunctive relief even though FLA. STAT. § 395.065(2) (1981) provides that "[t]here shall be no
liability on the part of, and no cause of action of any nature shall arise against, any hospital
...for any action taken in good faith and without malice (in conducting peer review pursuant
to Florida law)."
103. Id. at 1284.
104. Sosa v. Board of Managers of Val Verde Memorial Hosp., 437 F.2d 173, 177 (5th Cir.
1971).
105. 90 Cal. App. 3d 979, 983-84, 153 Cal. Rptr. 757, 760 (3d Dist. 1979).
106. 636 F. Supp. 608 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
107. Id. at 614.
108. 617 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Del. 1985).
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Parker doctrine. 1°9 Because Delaware did not mandate peer review,

and thus did not actively supervise a clearly articulated policy, the
court denied summary judgment for the defendants."° In dicta, however, the Quinn court said that the peer review process would not
necessarily impose any additional restriction on competition."' The
court thought that the peer review process was arguably procompetitive when conducted within the bounds of the medical profession.112
By monitoring the qualifications and performance of physicians, a review board may enhance competition by enabling consumers to make
a more informed choice.13

In Marrese v. Interqual, Inc.,114 the Seventh Circuit held that a
hospital staff conducting peer review was immune from antitrust liability under the state action doctrine. 115 The Seventh Circuit later
upheld a district court decision in Tambone v. Memorial Hospital,116
requiring evidence that the state actively supervised the peer review." 7 The circuit court stated that although the Department of
Health had access to peer review records, inspectors were not obligated to inspect these records. 18 Since the state did not engage in a
regular organized supervision of the peer review process, peer review
was not immune under the state action doctrine." 9
In the recent Supreme Court decision of 324 Liquor v. Duffy,120
the Court said that where a state simply authorizes a particular practice and enforces the consequences through private parties, there is
no active supervision. 121 In 324 Liquor, the New York statute at issue
allowed individual wholesalers of certain beverages to "post" monthly
price schedules and prohibited retailers from selling below the posted
price plus a certain markup percentage.' 22 The state agency in 324
Liquor did not review or establish the posted wholesale prices, 2 nor

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 1236.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
748
Id.
635
Id.
Id.
Id.
479
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1239.

F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1984).
at 391.
F. Supp. 508 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
at 510.
at 514.
at 515.
U.S. 335, 107 S. Ct. 720 (1987).
at 725.
at 722.
at 726.
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did the state monitor market conditions, supervise the private
wholesalers' posting decisions or "engage in any 'pointed reexamination' of the program.",-4
Following Patrick, states will need to supervise medical peer review more actively if members of the review committee are to have
immunity from actions under the Sherman Antitrust Act. Although
Patrick did not discuss the first prong of the Midcal test, it will still
remain the first consideration in determining whether the Parker doctrine will apply to the questioned action.
B.

The First Prong: Clearly Articulated State Policy

Parker addressed the question of whether the federal antitrust
laws prohibited a state, in exercising its sovereign powers, from imposing certain anticompetitive restraints.'2 Noting that the language
of the Sherman Act did not suggest that its purpose was to restrain
a "state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature," the Court held that the Sherman Act does not apply to the
anticompetitive conduct of a state acting through its legislation. 126
However, the Court asserted that a state cannot grant immunity to
individuals by authorizing them to violate the Sherman Act. 127 Instead,
the challenged activity must be "one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy . . . ."
To establish that a state's policy is clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed, the defendant must show that there is a state policy
to displace competition and that the legislature contemplated the kind
of anticompetitive actions alleged.12 Mere state neutrality toward the
challenged action does not meet this clear articulation and affirmative
expression requirement. 130 CaliforniaRetail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.131 set the standard for "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy. Analyzing the Califor-

124. Id. (quoting California Retail Liquor Dealers Assoc. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U.S. 97, 106 (1980)).
125. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943).
126. Id. at 368.
127. Id. at 351.
128. Id.
129. Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 663 F. Supp. 1360, 1419 (D.Kan. 1987) (quoting
California Aviation, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, 806 F.2d 905, 907 (9th Cir. 1986)).
130. Sterling Beef Co. v. City of Fort Morgan, 810 F.2d 961, 963 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 55 (1982)).
131. 445 U.S. 97, 105 (quoting California Aviation Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, 806 F.2d
905, 907 (9th Cir. 1986)).
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nia regulatory scheme, the Midcal court first determined that the
challenged restraint had met the standard since the regulations
explicitly permitted resale price maintenance.132
The Supreme Court recently applied the Midcal test to a regulatory
agency in Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United
States.133 Alleging that defendants, a private association of interstate
common carriers, had conspired with their members to fix rates for
the interstate transportation of general commodities, the petitioner
sought injunctive relief under section 1 of the Sherman Act.13 The
defendant associations, known as "rate bureaus," submitted joint rate
proposals to the public service commissions in their respective states.'35
In all four states involved, common carriers were allowed to agree on
rate proposals prior to submitting them to the states' regulatory agen-

cies. 13

The Southern Motor Carriers Court declared that the first prong
of the Midcal test did not require that the state policy in question
compel anticompetitive conduct by the regulated parties.137 The Court
stated that "[t]he federal antitrust laws do not prohibit the states
from adopting policies that permit, but do not compel, anticompetitive
conduct by regulated private parties."'1 Referring to the first prong
of the Midcal test, the Court reasoned that a state policy that expressly permits, but does not compel, anticompetitive conduct may be
"clearly articulated" within the meaning of Midcal.139 Since the government conceded that the states' public service commissions actively
supervised the collective ratemaking activities of the rate bureaus,
the outcome of the case turned on the Court's analysis under the first
prong of the Midcal test. 140
The Southern Motor Carriers Court asserted that to satisfy the
first prong of the Midcal analysis, the state legislature must have
clearly sanctioned collective ratemaking.141 Three of the four states
involved had passed statutes which explicitly permitted collective
ratemaking by common carriers.142 Mississippi, the only state which
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had not directly addressed collective ratemaking, had a statute which
allowed the Mississippi Public Service Commission to set "just and
reasonable" rates for intrastate transportation of general commodities.143 The Court determined that the Mississippi legislature had
clearly expressed its intent to allow a regulatory agency, rather than
the market, to determine intrastate rates. ' The Court held that when
a state as the sovereign clearly intends to displace competition in
a particular field with a regulatory structure, the first prong of the
Midcal test is satisfied.14
A private party acting pursuant to an anticompetitive program
need not point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization for its
challenged conduct. 146 If more detail than a clear intent to displace
competition were required of the legislature, states would have difficulty implementing their anticompetitive policies through regulatory
agencies. Agencies are created to deal with problems unforeseeable
to or outside the competence of the legislature. Requiring express
authorization for every action that an agency might find necessary to
implement state policy would diminish, if not destroy, the agency's
efficacy.147 If the state has a clear intent to establish an anticompetitive
regulatory program, then the state's failure to describe the details of
implementing the program will not subject the program to antitrust
restraints.14s
States regulate and supervise physician licensing through specific
state agencies. This agency in Florida is the Florida Department of
Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine. 49 The Florida Medical
Practice Act requires medical peer review committees to report any
disciplinary action taken against a physician to the Board of
Medicine.'5° The Act grants immunity from civil liability to committee
members and to individuals providing information to the committee.151
' 152
Both groups, however, must act without "intentional fraud.'

143. Id.
144. Id. at 63-64.
145. Id. at 65-66.
146. Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 453 U.S. 389, 415 (1977).
147. Cf. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 44 (1985) (citing Justice Stewart's
dissenting opinion in Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 434-35, requiring explicit legislative authorization
of anticompetitive activity, would impose "detrimental side effects upon municipalities' local
autonomy.").
148. Consolidated Gas Co. v. City Gas Co., 665 F. Supp. 1483, 1527 (S.D. Fla. 1987)
(quoting Southern Motor CarrierRate Conf., Inc., 471 U.S. at 64-65).
149. See FLA. STAT. § 458.307 (1989).
150. Id. § 458.337(1)(a)(1).
151. Id. § 766.101(3)(a).
152. Id.
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With the passage of the HCQIA, 15 Congress recognized the need
to protect physicians who participate in peer review committees.15
The HCQIA limits liability of peer review committee members acting
in the reasonable belief that their actions are furthering quality health
care. 1- The disciplining party seeking protection of the HCQIA must
make a reasonable effort to obtain the pertinent facts, give adequate
notice and hearing to the physician involved, and take only such action
as is reasonably warranted by the facts obtained. 1' However, the
57
HCQIA provides no immunity from civil rights actions.1
Compulsion is the best evidence of state policy. Florida demonstrates its peer review policy by compelling hospitals, as a condition
of licensing, to establish peer review committees.158 By compelling
physicians to review their competitors, Florida has expressed a policy
to regulate competition among physicians. Florida law clearly contemplates that peer review activity may replace competition in some
instances.159 The state has thus chosen to replace competition in order
to promote quality health care.
Congress recognized the need to protect medical peer review committees from antitrust actions. 18 Congress, therefore, provided reporting systems in the HCQIA that require state regulatory agencies to
monitor and report activities of peer review committees.61 Congress'

intent thereby is to replace competition with carefully monitored and
supervised review activity.
153.
154.

42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-52 (Supp. IV 1986).
Id. § 11101 provides that:

(1) The increasing occurrence of medical malpractice and the need to improve the
quality of medical care have become nationwide problems that warrant greater
efforts than those that can be undertaken by any individual state.
(3) This nationwide problem can be remedied through effective professional peer
review.
(4) The threat of private money damage liability under Federal laws, including
treble damage liability under Federal antitrust law, unreasonably discourages physicians from participating in effective professional peer review.
(5) There is an overriding national need to provide incentive and protection for
physicians engaging in effective professional peer review.
Id.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. § 11111(a)(1).
Id. § 11112(a).
Id. § 11111(a)(1).
FLA. STAT. § 458.313 (Supp. 1988).
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 11101 (Supp. IV 1986).
Id. §§ 11133-34.
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The ultimate benefactor of any antitrust action is the consumer.
Requiring reporting of incompetent medical personnel enables the consumer to obtain better quality medical care. By monitoring the qualifications and performance of physicians, the review process compensates for consumers' lack of medical care information. The peer review
process is thus actually procompetitive.
A close examination of the health care regulations of many states
reveals that they do not expressly permit anticompetitive conduct by
hospitals and their medical staffs. The regulations typically prohibit
denials made for purely anticompetitive reasons and permit the denial
of medical staff privileges only on professional or ethical grounds. Such
regulations could be viewed as procompetitive. Since many personnel
decisions made in competitive job markets are based on professional
or ethical grounds, allowing medical staffs to make hospital staffing
decisions on such grounds is not tantamount to approving anticompetitive conduct.162
Instead of allowing the market to establish intrastate common carrier rates, the regulations in Southern Motor Carriersexplicitly provided that a regulatory agency determine the rates.- In addition, the
California statutory scheme in Midcal expressly required that a state
regulatory agency determine a price schedule for all wines sold in the
state.- Accordingly, state health care regulations must indicate an
intent to permit hospitals and their medical staffs to engage in anticompetitive conduct or demonstrate that the logical result of the regulation-authorized activities would inhibit competition.-5 If the state's
regulatory scheme does not expressly authorize anticompetitive conduct, the scheme may not satisfy the first prong of the Midcal test.
Since the Patrick Court chose not to define what constitutes
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" in medical peer review statutes, the lower courts provide the only guidance. Courts
adjudicating peer review actions have liberally interpreted the first

162. Posner v. Lankenau Hosp., 645 F. Supp. 1102, 1117 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (Although some
medical staffs may engage in anticompetitive conduct while in compliance with the state regulatory scheme, this does not necessarily demonstrate the legislature's intent to permit such conduct.). See also infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
163. 471 U.S. 48, 63-64 (1985).
164. California Retail Liquor Dealers Assoc. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980).
165. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 42 (1985); Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 789-90 (1975) (state did not indicate intention to do away with competition among lawyers merely because it authorized its highest court to regulate the practice of
law).

1988-1989]

MEDICAL PEER REVIEW IMMUNITY

prong of the Midcal test. In Marrese v. Interqual, Inc., ' 66 a surgeon
brought an antitrust action against a hospital and its executive committee for revoking his hospital privileges.167 The Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals upheld the district court's dismissal of the complaint, holding that defendants were immune from antitrust liability pursuant to
the Parker "state action" doctrine.Applying the Midcal standard, the court first examined Indiana's
statutory scheme governing hospitals. 169 Indiana requires all hospitals
70
to establish peer review committees to ensure quality health care.'
To achieve that goal, the peer review committees were required to
review and evaluate the qualifications and performance of medical
staff members.171 The court of appeals reasoned that a necessary and
reasonable consequence of the state mandated medical peer process
was that members of the hospital medical staff must review the performance of competing staff members and recommend the revocation
of staff privileges in some situations.172 Accordingly, the first prong
the Midcal test was satisfied.
Interestingly, the Marrese court never actually applied the Midcal
standard since it never determined whether Indiana clearly expressed
an intent to permit anticompetitive conduct. 173 Applying the Parker
doctrine, the Marrese court considered the effect that a denial of
antitrust immunity would have on the willingness of physicians to
participate in peer review activities.14 The court noted that the Indiana
statutory scheme provided members of peer review committees with
5
absolute immunity from civil liability for actions taken in good faith.'1
The court reasoned that this grant of statutory immunity furthered
the underlying purpose of the Sherman Act, the protection of consumer
welfare, by assuring the competency and quality of hospital medical
staffs. 76

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
surgical
revoked
174.
175.
176.

748 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985).
Id.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 387-88.
Id. at 387 (quoting IND. CODE § 16-10-1-6.5 (1982)).
Id. at 388 (quoting IND. CODE § 34-4-12.6-1 (1982)).
Id.
Id. at 387 ("Our initial inquiry is whether the defendants' review of Dr. Marrese's
'back' procedures at Deaconess and the recommendation that his clinical privileges be
is conduct clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy.").
Id. at 391.
Id. at 391-93.
Id. at 392.
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In a later Seventh Circuit decision, Tambone v. Memorial Hospital,177 the court determined that a statute granting good faith immunity
from civil liability to peer review committee members was sufficient
to meet the first prong of the Midcal test. 178 The Tambone court,
while conceding that it was bound by the Marrese decision, reasoned
that the peer review immunity statute proved that the legislature
intended to affect competition in the marketplace. 75 Some states' peer
review protection acts may provide members of hospital peer review
committees with qualified immunity from civil liability. 180 However,
the acts may not demonstrate that the legislature intended to permit
anticompetitive activity as a necessary consequence of the regulatory
scheme which it designed for health care facilities.' 8 ' Still, other courts
have stated that whether the antitrust exemption would frustrate the
policy of the peer review statute is irrelevant: the relevant inquiry is
not whether the exemption would foster the statute's purpose but
whether restricting competition is a necessary consequence of engaging
2
in the state-promoted activity.1
III.

APPLICATION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT TO
MEDICAL PEER REVIEW IMMUNITY

Applicants denied privileges at hospitals frequently allege that
members of the hospital staff used the medical peer review committee
as a trade restraint mechanism. Although section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act'as provides that every conspiracy in restraint of trade
violates the law, the Supreme Court has narrowly construed the term
"every" as used in section 1 to refer only to those agreements which
"unreasonably" restrain trade.18 Depending upon the nature of the
case, two different forms of legal analysis are used to determine
whether a business practice "unreasonably" restrains trade and violates section 1 of the Sherman Act: the per se rule and the rule of
reason.1 5

177. 825 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1987).
178. Id. at 1135.
179. Id. at 1134-35.
180. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 766.107(3)(a) (1981).
181. Southern Motor Carriers,471 U.S. at 51 (noting that state public service commissions
have and exercise ultimate authority and control over all intrastate rates).
182. See Quinn v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1226 (D.C. Del. 1985).
183. 15 U.S.C. § 1 provides that "[e]very contract combination in the form of trust or
otherwise or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with
foreign nations is declared to be illegal."
184. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59 60 (1911).
185. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
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A.

Per Se Rule of Analysis

Through the course of antitrust litigation, the courts have found
that some restraints are so patently contrary to free market principles
and so deficient in redeeming economic virtue, that they are illegal
per se.'16 The Supreme Court has applied the per se rule to four
different kinds of agreements: horizontal and vertical price fixing,
horizontal market division, group boycotts or concerted refusals to
deal, and tying arrangements.1 8 7 These arrangements are presumptively illegal because they typically function only to stifle competition.1' 8
Initially medical peer members who deny or revoke a physician's
clinical privileges appear to be analogous to a group boycott or a
concerted refusal to deal. 189 Exactly what types of activities fall within
the forbidden group boycott category are, however, far from certain. 190
Cases to which courts have applied the per se approach have generally involved joint efforts by firms to disadvantage competitors by
persuading suppliers or customers to deny relationships the competitors need in order to compete in the market.191 In those cases, the
boycott often cuts off access to a supply, facility or market necessary
92
to enable the boycotted firm to compete.
The actions of peer review committee members who deny a competing physician access to a particular hospital may be construed as
denying the boycotted physician an advantage required to compete in
the marketplace. Physicians on a medical peer review committee
clearly possess a dominant position in the relevant market. Without
the ability to admit patients to a medical facility, a physician must
transfer patients to a competing physician with admitting privileges.
Refusing to admit a physician to a hospital staff or restricting clinical
privileges thus decreases market competition and impairs overall market efficiency.

186.
187.
(9th Cir.
Gough v.
188.
189.
190.

Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
See Cascade Cabinet Co. v. Western Cabinet & Millwork, Inc., 710 F.2d 1366, 1370
1983) (citing A.H. Cox & Co. v. Star Mach. Co. 653 F.2d 1302, 1305 (9th Cir. 1981));
Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 386 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979).
See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Store's, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.

284, 294 (1985) (quoting L.

SULLIVAN,

HANDBOOK OF LAW OF ANTITRUST

229-30 (1977)).

See also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 543 (1978).
191. 472 U.S. 284, 294 (quoting L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF LAW OF ANTITRUST 261-62
(1977)).
192. Id.
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Although a concerted refusal to deal need not possess all of these
traits to merit per se treatment, not every cooperative activity involving a restraint or exclusion will have the predominantly anticompetitive
consequences exhibited by the boycotts.193 In National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma,19
the Supreme Court recognized that per se treatment of the NCAA's
restrictions on the marketing of televised college football was inappropriate. 195 Despite the NCAA's obvious restraint on output, the Court
did not apply per se analysis since the case involved an industry in
which horizontal restraints on competition were essential if the product
was to be available at all. 9
If the per se rule applies to the questioned practice, the court
must presume that the practice is unreasonable as a matter of law
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm caused or the business
excuse used.197But the courts have been reluctant to declare business
practices or agreements illegal per se. Courts employ the per se rule
only after long experience reveals a business practice's "pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue ... ."198
In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery &
Printing Co.,' 99 the Supreme Court defined the category of group
boycotts that mandate per se condemnation.200 The plaintiff, a retailer,
was summarily expelled from a purchasing cooperative for failing to
report a change in its stock ownership as required by cooperative
regulations. 201 The plaintiff alleged that the defendants engaged in a
group boycott which was a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 2° The Court stated that a plaintiff invoking the per se rule must
establish that the challenged activity is likely to have predominantly
anticompetitive effects." The Court then noted that the expulsion did
not imply an anticompetitive intent because the rule violated by the
plaintiff served the useful purpose of allowing the cooperative to
monitor its member's creditworthiness. 204

193.
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195.
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198.
199.
200.
201.
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203.
204.

Id. at 295.
468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984).
Id. at 100.
Id. at 120.
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607 (1972).
Id.
472 U.S. 284 (1985).
Id. at 293.
Id.
Id. at 287.
Id. at 298.
Id. at 296.
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Similarly, the promotion of quality care and treatment of patients
requires hospitals to thoroughly evaluate the professional competence,
ethics, and reputation of medical staff applicants. Further, quality
conscious hospitals will periodically review the qualifications of its
staff through a peer review or medical audit mechanism. Hospitals,
like doctors, must consider the welfare of their patients above all else
and must establish basic procedures to prevent incompetent or unethical physicians from inflicting injury. °1. Relevant Product Market
The Supreme Court in Pacific Stationery used the concept of market power to determine whether the per se rule applied to group
boycotts.m Since market power is measured in relation to a particular
product market, the market definition bears directly upon a firm's
degree of market.- ° Thus, to prove that a defendant has market power,
the first step is to establish the bounds of the relevant market. In
general, the relevant market is "the area of effective competition" as
to a particular product. 2°8 A relevant product market describes groups
of producers with similar products, who have the ability, actual or
potential, to take significant amounts of business away from each
other.2 Hospitals within reasonable proximity to each other may typically provide the same or similar products. Hence, a hospital's ability
to attract consumers from other facilities will depend upon its business
practices and medical staff.
Properly identifying a market in any given case requires consideration of the market's geographic, product, and production dimensions.210 The geographical dimension is the physical area within which
21 1
the particular product or service is or may be sold to consumers.
The plaintiff has the burden of defining and proving the scope of the
relevant market for medical services. 212 The main consideration in defining the market for medical services is the geographical dimension
since it establishes the boundaries within which a particular product

205. Marrese v. Interqual, 748 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985).
206. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 472 U.S. at 284.
207. Id. at 293.
208. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962).
209. Kaplan v. Burroughs Corp., 611 F.2d 286, 292 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S.
924 (1980).
210. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, II ANTITRUST LAW 518, at 347 (1978).
211. See Grason Elec. Co. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 571 F. Supp. 1504, 1523 (E.D.
Cal. 1983); II ANTITRUST LAW 522, at 299 (Supp. 1986).
212. Cf. Devoto v. Pacific Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 618 F.2d 1340, 1344 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980).
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is presently available. 213 Hospitals that are within thirty miles or thirty
214
minutes of each other are competitors.
Proximity alone, however, does not determine the relevant market.
Market share is not synonymous with market power. Market imperfections may exist that permit medical care providers to charge noncompetitive prices for hospital services. For example, the prevalence of
third-party payment for health care costs reduces price competition.
In addition, lack of adequate information prevents consumers from
evaluating the quality of the medical care provided by competing hos-

pitals.215
One hospital may offer particular facilities or equipment to a
21 6
specializing physician that another in the same area may not offer.
However, consumers of medical care are unlikely to be fully aware of
the differences between the two competing facilities. The two hospitals
should thus be differentiated when defining the geographical market.
Product dimension refers to the availability of similar products that
may be used in place of the disputed product. 217 Where one product
can easily replace another product, the two "cross-products" are called
substitutes. These products should be considered to be in the same
market if there is a high degree of substitution between them.
Members of professional peer review committees can similarly provide the disputed product of medical services. However, due to the
highly specialized nature of modern medicine, only physicians of like
specialty qualify to judge the appropriateness of their fellow specialist's
medical care. Thus, the review committee should be viewed as substitutes for the very person they are evaluating. In fact, the review
committee and the aggrieved plaintiff can, for all practical purposes,
be considered perfect substitutes.
The production dimension has to do with the capacity of other
companies to produce or make available the product or service in
response to a price increase by a particular entity. 218 The production
dimension is important because the ability to raise prices by restricting

213. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
214. Bhan v. N.M.E. Hospitals, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 998, 1019 (E.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd and
remanded on other grounds, 772 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1985).
215. Jefferson Parish Hosp., 466 U.S. at 27 & n.45.
216. For example, of two hospitals on the same block, one may offer obstetrical services
with "state of the art" facilities and the other may offer services that are at best only marginal,
or perhaps none at all.
217. GrasonElec. Co., 571 F. Supp. at 1521-23; see also II ANTITRUST LAW 517, at 346.

218.

II

ANTITRUST LAW

517, at 346.
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output is limited by other firms' abilities to profitably expand their
219
output in response.
The capacity to fill the gap in production left by another entity
seeking to limit its output is measured by the cross-elasticity of supply. 22 When a hospital can easily increase production, or otherwise
make the product or service available, the cross-elasticity of supply
is said to be high. 221 Peer review members can conceivably raise their
own production by seeing more patients or extending office hours to
make the medical services product more available. Accordingly, the
cross-elasticity of the medical service product by members of a medical
peer review committee is high.
2.

Market Power

After establishing the dimensions of the relevant product market,
the trier of fact can reasonably infer whether a hospital has market
power.2 Market power is different from monopoly power. Monopoly
power, which is required to prove a Sherman Act section 1 violation,
is the power to control prices or exclude competition in the relevant
market.3 Conversely, market power, is the power that permits a firm
to force a purchaser to do something that the purchaser would not do
in a competitive market.- Market power can be established by showing that the firm has a predominant share of the market. 2 5 Even if
a hospital or member of the professional review committee does not
have a predominant share of the market, it can possess market power
if it offers a product that is unique or that has special consumer
appeal. 2- 6 So long as the seller can exert power over some of the
buyers in the market, even if this power is not complete, the seller
has market power.The Supreme Court set the contemporary standard for market
share in Times-Picayune PublishingCo. v. United States.2 s The Court
held that a newspaper that attracted forty percent of sales classified lineage did not possess market dominance. 2 9 In Jefferson Parish

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

II ANTITRUST LAW 519, at 349.
Twin City Sportservice v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 1264, 1271 (9th Cir. 1975).
Id.
Bhan, 669 F. Supp. at 1019.
United States v. E.I. Dupont, 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
Jefferson Parish Hosp., 466 U.S. at 14.
United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962).
Id.
Fortner Enterprises v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
345 U.S. 594, 612 (1953).
Id.
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Hospital District 2 v. Hyde,20 the Court extended the standard to
hospitals.3 1 The Court found that a hospital did not possess market
power when it attracted only thirty percent of patients residing in
the geographic market.The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Goss v. Memorial Hospital
Systemm addressed a similar market share issue. Defendants, members of a Houston hospital's Ob-Gyn committee, suspended the
privileges of plaintiff obstetrician.- Plaintiff then brought an antitrust
action against the hospital and certain physicians on the committee.M
The Goss court held that the per se rule of antitrust violation did not
apply to the alleged Ob Gyn committee boycott.m The hospitals were
only two out of approximately sixty hospitals located in the county,
and each had less than six percent of the county's total patient admissions . 3 7 The Fifth Circuit reasoned this was insufficient to present a
threshold case of market power.m A threshold case is where the
alleged boycott of the physician is likely to have an anticompetitive
effect.3 9
In Bhan C.R.N.A. v. N.M.E. Hospital, Inc. the district court
noted that a trier of fact must focus on the hospital's share of the
surgical market to ascertain the hospital's power to influence area
patients' choices of anesthesiologists. m The court held that a 7.9%
share of the medical/surgical beds and 6.8% of the total number of
patient days presented unrebuttable evicence of the hospital's nondominant share of the surgical services market.2l According to the court,
the patients in the competition area had a wide spectrum of alternatives to the defendant hospital's surgical services.- The hospital
clearly lacked sufficient economic power to affect the market m
230. 466 U.S. at 26 & n.43.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. 789 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1986).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 355.
237. Id.
238. Goss, 789 F.2d at 355.
239. Id.
240. Bhan, 669 F. Supp. at 1019.
241. Id. at 1020.
242. Id. See also Ezpeleta v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 621 F. Supp. 1262 (1985),
affd, 800 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1986) (exclusive service contract between contractor anesthesiologist
and hospital not illegal per se as violation where hospital's market share for surgery patients
was nine percent, as the hospital did not have sufficient market power in field of hospital surgery
to force patients to use anesthesiologist's services).
243. Id.
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While courts have not specified an exact percentage determining
market share, extremes on the high end have been recently noted.
In Oltz v. St. Peters Community Hospital,- a nurse anesthetist
brought an antitrust conspiracy suit against the hospital and certain
of its anesthesiologists. 245 The court found that the hospital was the
only one available in the community to the general public.A In addition, it was the only hospital equipped to do general surgery. - 7 The
hospital had a market share of eighty-four percent. 2" The Oltz court
reasoned that when the defendant's capacity to control prices or
exclude competition is in question, it may be necessary to determine
the defendant's market power as to a given product in a given market.2 49 In such cases, the trier of fact must ascertain the relevant
market.2*° When a defendant has a monopoly in a given area, however,
further inquiry is unnecessary. 5 1 The court then held that the hospital's
eighty-four percent market share determined its monopoly on anesthesia services.252 Hence, the plaintiff nurse anesthetist did not have
25
to establish a relevant product and geographic market.
When a peer review committee revokes a hospital staff member's
hospital privileges, this revocation does not necessarily imply an anticompetitive act. To establish anticompetitive behavior, the evidence
must show that the hospital possessed the "market power" necessary
to suppress effective competition. 2 4 Plaintiffs should present evidence
tending to establish that the services offered by the hospital are unavailable at other hospitals. Further, plaintiffs must demonstrate that
the hospital had unique access to a business element which plaintiff
needed to compete with other physicians in his field.
In sum, a plaintiff seeking application of the per se rule must
present a threshold case showing that the challenged activity is likely
to have a predominantly anticompetitive effect. The mere allegation
of a concerted refusal to deal does not suffice because not all concerted
refusals to deal are predominantly anticompetitive. A plaintiff challenging expulsion from a joint buying cooperative must show that the

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

656 F. Supp. 760 (D. Mont. 1987).
Id.
Id. at 763.
Id.
Id.
Oltz, 656 F. Supp. at 763.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 576 (1966)).

252.
253.

Id.
Id.

254.

Jefferson ParishHosp., 466 U.S. at 3.
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cooperative possesses market power or unique access to a business
element for effective competition.? Absent such a showing, courts
would apply a rule of reason analysis.2
B.

Rule of Reason Anaylsis

If unsuccessful in showing that concerted action is illegal under a
per se analysis, a plaintiff may show that it is illegal under the rule
of reason test. To prevail under that test, the plaintiff must prove (1)
that defendants acted in concert, (2) that the concerted action was
intended to harm or unreasonably restrain competition, and (3) that
the concerted action actually caused an injury to competition.Y- Plaintiffs injury alone is insufficient to prove injury to competition.- Plaintiffs must instead prove that competition in the relevant product market has been harmed in some way. 259 To prove harm to competition
in a relevant market, a plaintiff must first show the existence of a
relevant market.
The relevant market for determining the anticompetitive effect of
defendants' conduct under a rule of reason analysis is not necessarily
the same as the relevant market for a per se analysis.261 Defining the
relevant market requires an examination of the geographic dimension,
the product dimension (measured by cross-elasticity of demand), and
the production dimension (measured by cross-elasticity of supply).2
In large metropolitan areas with many health care facilities, it may
be impossible to infer the market's geographical boundaries for specific
physician services. Conversely, in a small rural area with only one
hospital, the relevant market may be identified with great specificity.
Factors used to determine the relevant market include the distribution
in the area of physicians and hospitals.263 Other pertinent factors in-

255. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 298.
256. Id. at 284.
257. O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer Co., 792 F.2d 1464, 1469 (9th Cir. 1986); Jefferson
Parish Hosp., 466 U.S. at 29; DeVoto v. Pacific Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 618 F.2d 1340, 1344.
See also Cascade Cabinet Co. v. Western Cabinet & Millwork, Inc., 710 F.2d 1366, 1373 (summary judgment appropriate when plaintiff fails to produce evidence of harm to competition).
258. O.S.C. Corp., 792 F.2d at 1469.
259. Devoto, 618 F.2d at 1344-45.
260. Jefferson ParishHosp., 466 U.S. at 29. See also L.A. Draper & Son v. WheelabratorFrye, Inc., 735 F.2d 414, 422-23 & n.14 (11th Cir. 1984).
261. See Jefferson Parish Hosp., 466 U.S. at 29.
262. Bhan v. N.M.E. Hospitals, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 998, 1021 (E.D. Cal. 1987).
263. For example, a small rural community may have several family practice doctors, but
few, if any, obstetricians.
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elude cross-elasticity of demand 264 and cross-elasticity of supply.26 Finally, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the denial of privileges foreclosed so much of the market from plaintiff's penetration that the
266
denial constituted an unreasonable restraint on competition.
Under the rule of reason analysis, courts must weigh all of the
facts to decide whether a restrictive practice is an unreasonable restraint on competition.267 To make this determination, courts may
examine the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint,
the reasons for the restraint's imposition, and the restraint's actual
impact on competition. 2 -s The aggrieved physician must, therefore,
show some restraint on competition. If a physician is denied privileges
at one hospital, but has privileges at other hospitals, that physician
may be able to persuade patients to follow him to another hospital.
Therefore, to demonstrate the impact of the peer review committee's
competitive restraint, the physician plaintiff should show the loss of
patients as a result of the committee's action. Under the rule of reason
analysis, a court may properly grant summary judgment to the defendant hospital and its peer review committee if the physician cannot
269
demonstrate an unreasonable restraint on medical practice.
IV.

CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS,

1983

CLAIMS

Complaints against medical peer review committees frequently allege a civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 270 The complaint
typically alleges that the hospital committee acted under state supervision and thus under "color of state law" in denying plaintiff
privileges. Other claims contend that a hospital which receives either
state or federal funds acts under color of state law. 27'
264. For example, patients could reasonably substitute the services of a thoracic surgeon
with that of a general surgeon or an internal medicine specialist with that of a cardiologist.
265. Bhan, 669 F. Supp. at 1021.
266. Cf. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 30 n.51 (1984).
267. Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
268. Hornsby Oil Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 713 F.2d 1384, 1392 (5th Cir. 1983).
269. Bhan, 669 F. Supp. at 1021.
270. Civil Rights Cases, 3 S. Ct. 18, 21-24 (1883). See also Shelly v. Kramer, 68 S. Ct.
856 (1948); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 81 S. Ct. 856 (1961); Moose Lodge No. 107
v. Irvis, 92 S. Ct. 1965 (1972). Section 1983 states in relevant part:
[E]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
271.

See infra note 286 and accompanying text.
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A section 1983 claim in a medical peer review action raises several
issues. The first is whether or not the state, in passing a medical
practice act, created a sufficiently close nexus between the activities
of the hospital's credentials committee and the state for the actions
of the committee to be reasonably attributed to the state. 272 A second
issue frequently contested is whether the receipt of state funds creates
273
a sufficient nexus to qualify as a state action.
Section 1983 requires an element of state action or state involvement in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights, privileges or
immunities.274 However, the precise nature and scope of the state
action requirement has been the subject of ongoing litigation.--, Patrick
v. Burget did not address the issue of a section 1983 claim in the
context of a medical peer review committee who denies or revokes a
physician's clinical privileges. This question has yet to be presented
to the Supreme Court.
The circuit courts, however, have considered the state action issue
in light of present legislation without regard to Patrick. In Goss v.
Memorial Hospital System,276 the plaintiff physician contended that
the state statute providing immunity to peer review members effectively made the peer review committee an investigatory arm of the
state. 277 The Fifth Circuit in Goss rejected the argument. 278 Following
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,279 the Goss court held that a finding of state
action requires a nexus between the committee's acts and the state
such that the committee's conduct is fairly attributable to the state.
That nexus exists when the state exercises coercive power or has
provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that
the choice must be deemed to be that of the state.2 1 The actions of
the state in Goss did not meet this standard, and thus the peer review
committee did not act under the color of state law.2

272. See infra notes 281 & 313 and accompanying text.
273. See infra notes 286, 290, 304-08, 314-18, 330-32 and accompanying text.
274. See infra notes 309-12, 319-27 and accompanying text.
275. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-14 (1883); Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 13-23
(1948); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721-26 (1961); Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171-79 (1972).
276. 789 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1986).
277. Id. at 354.
278. Id. at 356.
279. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
280. 789 F.2d at 356 (quoting Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982)).
281. Id. (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).
282. Id.
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Patrick raises an interesting question regarding a claimant's ability
to bring a section 1983 action. After Patrick, states will want to
actively supervise medical peer review activities in order to qualify
for immunity under the Patrick interpretation of the state action doctrine. The question will then be whether that active supervision creates
a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the medical peer
review committee to qualify under a section 1983 claim. Note that not
even the HCQIA provides for medical peer review immunity under a
section 1983 claim. 28
States generally do not appoint members of the credentials committee. In addition, states do not exercise any oversight over the committee apart from the general review of all hospital activities for accrediThe mere existence of state regulation does not
tation purposes.
transform the regulated activity into state action for purposes of section 1983. 2
Hospitals which receive public funds for construction, operation or
reimbursement for services have been challenged under the "state
action" requirement. The Fifth Circuit, in Jatoi v. Hurst-Euless-Bedford Hospital Authority,2 dealt with such a challenge. The plaintiff
physician, who was denied hospital privileges, alleged that the "state
action" requirement of section 1983 was satisfied by involvement of a
hospital authority. 287 The hospital authority at issue was a public corporation created by statute to serve a public purpose, but it did not
2
have direct input into the hospital's routine operations. 1 The court
chose to overturn the district court's decision to follow Madry v.
Sorel- 9 and instead found state action under the Supreme Court's
standard set forth in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.29 °

283. 42 U.S.C. § 1l111(a)(1) (1986) provides that under certain circumstances, one who
participates in a medical peer review activity shall not be liable under the law of the United
States or of any state. However, "[tihe preceding sentence shall not apply to damages under
any law of the United States or any State relating to the civil rights of any person or persons."
284. For example, the Texas Medical Practice Act only provides for members of the Texas
State Board of Medical Examiners to be appointed by the State. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 4495b § 2.03 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
285. Quinn v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1226, 1234 (D.C. Del. 1985).
286. 807 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1987).
287. Id. at 1217.
288. Id. at 1220.
289. 558 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978), reh'g denied, 435 U.S.
982 (1978). A doctor whose staff privileges were "permanently suspended" by the hospital alleged
that he had been denied due process of law when he was discharged without notice or hearing.
The Fifth Circuit held that the fact that a private, nonprofit, tax-exempt hospital received
support from the local and federal government did not render the hospital's actions "state action."
290. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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In Burton, the City of Wilmington created the Parking Authority
to provide public parking facilities, and the city used public bonds to
finance construction of a parking garage. 291 The Authority entered into
a long-term lease with a restaurant that adopted a racially discriminatory policy.- The Supreme Court held that the discriminatory policy
was "under color of state law" because the restaurant was part of a
public building devoted to a public service.m The Court found that
the state, through the Authority, was indirectly involved in the restaurant's operation, and it enjoyed a mutually beneficial relationship with
the restaurant.29 According to the Court, this relationship made the
295
state a joint participant in the discriminatory activity.
Following Burton the Supreme Court continued to develop the
concept of state action in cases involving private facilities. In RendellBaker v. Kohn, 29 former teachers and a vocational counselor at a
nonprofit, privately operated school brought a civil rights action
against the school.- 7 Plaintiffs alleged a violation of their constitutional
rights to free speech and due process in connection with their employment discharge.- The Kohn court held that the plaintiffs employed
by the private facility failed to establish state action.9
In another private facility case, Blum v. Yaretsky,- ° residents at
a private nursing home sued, alleging that they had not been afforded
adequate notice of their transfer to a lower level of nursing care and
that this lack of notice violated their fourteenth amendment rights.30 1
As in Kohn, the Blum court held that plaintiffs failed to establish

"state action.

°

302

The Fifth Circuit, in Jatoi, distinguished Kohn and Blum. 3 03 The
defendants in Kohn and Blum operated private facilities that received
some public funds, whereas the hospital in Jatoi was publicly owned
and entirely constructed with public funds.30 In Kohn and Blum, the

291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Id. at 717-18.
Id. at 719-20.
Id. at 724.
Id.
Id. at 725.
457 U.S. 830 (1982).
Id. at 833.
Id. at 834-35.
Id. at 837.
457 U.S. 991 (1982).
Id. at 993.
Id. at 1012.
Jatoi v. Hurst-Euless-Bedford Hosp. Auth., 807 F.2d 1214, 1221 (5th Cir. 1987).
Id.
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state did not benefit financially from the private operation of the
facility.305 Conversely, in Jatoi, repayment of the bonds used to construct the hospital was directly linked to operation of the hospital. 3 06
Like the Wilmington Parking Authority in Burton, the hospital authority in Jatoi was a public corporation created by statute to serve a
public purpose 30 7 The public attributes of the hospital authority
created the necessary state action nexus between the authority and
the state. 308
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. ,o9 the Supreme Court found
that the acts of a privately owned, but state regulated utility, did not
constitute state action.3 10 The Jackson plaintiff sued the utility company under section 1983 for disconnecting her electricity service without notice and opportunity for a hearing.311 Although the state heavily
regulated the utility, the Supreme Court held that the mere fact that
a business is subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its
action into that of the state.31 2 The inquiry must be whether there is
a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged action
of the regulated entity so that the entity's action may be fairly treated
as that of the state itself.313
Following Jackson, courts in the Third Circuit have declined to
find state action by private hospitals.3 14 In Hodge v. Paoli Memorial
Hospital,3l5 a physician who was denied hospital staff privileges
brought suit under section 1983, arguing that the hospital's receipt of
federal funds and state benefits made the termination of his privileges

305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
310. Id. at 358.
311. Id. at 347.
312. Id. at 350.
313. Id. at 351.
314. See, e.g., Quinn v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1226 (D.C. Del. 1985). A
physician brought civil rights and antitrust claims against a private hospital for the hospital's
refusal to admit him to its medical staff. The plaintiff asserted that the hospital's decision to
deny him staff privileges constituted state action because the hospital was a public entity. Id.
at 1233. The court held that the private hospital's refusal to admit the physician did not constitute
state action for purposes of a § 1983 claim. Id. at 1235. The court reached this result even
though the hospital was dedicated to public use, was subject to state regulation, received tax
benefits associated with its public function, received funding from public sources, had a monopoly
on hospital facilities in the area, and complied with federal regulations governing conditions
under which hospitals receive federal aid. Id. at 1234.
315. 576 F.2d 563 (3d Cir. 1978).
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state action. 316 The Third Circuit disagreed, stating that the receipt
of federal construction funds and medicare and medicaid funds did not
constitute state action under section 1983.317 In addition, the Court
held that state licensing requirements for nonprofit hospitals do not
31s
constitute state action.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently considered the state
action question in Tarabishi v. McAlester Regional Hospital.3 19 The

physician in Tarabishi brought an action under section 1983 after the
defendant hospital revoked his staff privileges. 32° The court cited
Kohn,32 and Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co.,3 1 in analyzing what actions

may be "fairly attributable to the state," and employed a two part
test. 3? First, the exercise of some state created right, privilege or

rule of conduct must cause the deprivation. 3 -4 Second, the party
charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said
to be a state actor.3 2 The court noted that the defendant hospital was

a public trust created under state laws, and its trustees were public
officers acting on behalf of the state.

26

The court thus held that the

actions of the trustees who terminated the physician's privileges were
''327
actions "fairly attributable to the state.

The Sixth Circuit considered the possibility of a similar section
1983 action in Sarin v. Samaritan Health Center.a The Sarin

316. Id. at 563-64.
317.

Id. at 564.

318. Id. See also Holton v. Crozier-Chester Med. Center, 419 F. Supp. 334 (E.D. Pa. 1976),
vacated on other grounds, 560 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1977); Sament v. Hahnemann Med. College &
Hosp., 413 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Acosta v. Tyrone Hosp., 410 F. Supp. 1275 (W.D.
Pa. 1976); Allen v. Sisters of St. Joseph, 361 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Tex. 1973) (plaintiffs failed
to demonstrate requisite state action to maintain cause of action under federal civil rights statute
providing for liability for deprivation of rights under color of state law).
319. 827 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1987).
320. Id. at 650.
321. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
322. 457 U.S. 922 (1982). A debtor brought action under § 1983 claim against corporate
creditor alleging that by attaching his property before judgment, defendants acted jointly with
the state to deprive him of his property without due process of law. The Supreme Court held
that the debtor was deprived of property through state action; because the corporation acted
under color of state law, the § 1983 claim was valid).
323. Tarabishi v. McAlester Regional Hosp., 827 F.2d 648, 651-52 (10th Cir. 1982) (quoting
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 652.
327. Id.
328. 813 F.2d 755 (6th Cir. 1987).
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plaintiff, a physician whose medical privileges had been restricted,
sought relief from the hospital under section 1983.3- Plaintiff claimed
state action based on the hospital's receipt of funds from Medicare
and Medicaid and state regulation. 3m Citing an earlier Sixth Circuit
case with similar facts, 83 1 the Sarin court held that state licensing and
regulation of the defendant hospital and its receipt of federal funds
did not establish state action. 332 This is the prevailing view among the
circuit courts.
V.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

The Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination . . . or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
states. '"- It also prohibits "monopoliz[ing] any part of the trade or
commerce among the several states. '" 34 In pleading a cause of action
under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff must
adequately allege the jurisdictional requirement of state commerce.3
Although Patrick did not raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, courts summarily dismiss claims in which the plaintiff fails to
allege a sufficient interstate commerce nexus. 33 6 However, courts
should not dismiss a complaint unless it appears beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove "no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.'3 7 Plaintiffs must demonstrate a nexus
between the defendants' activity and interstate commerce.

329. Id. at 757.
330. Id. at 759.
331. Id. (citing Crowder v. Conlan, 740 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1984)). A hospital restricted a
physician's staff privileges. The hospital received a large percentage of its revenues from government sources, including Medicare and Medicaid. In addition, the state extensively regulated
the hospital. The county owned the hospital, and two local government officials sat on the
hospital board. Despite these facts, the Crowder court did not find a sufficient nexus between
the state and the hospital to warrant a finding of state action. Id.
332. Id.
333. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
334. Id. § 2.
335. See McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 241-42 (1980).
336. See Hayden v. Bracy, 744 F.2d 1338, 1342-43 (8th Cir. 1984); Furlong v. Long Island
College Hosp., 710 F.2d 922, 926-28 (2d Cir. 1983); Capili v. Shott, 620 F.2d 438, 439 (4th Cir.
1980) (per curiam); Wolf v. Jane Phillips Episcopal-Memorial Med. Ctr., 513 F.2d 684, 687-88
(10th Cir. 1975).
337. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
338. McLain, 444 U.S. at 246. See also Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms,
Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1281-82 (7th Cir. 1983); Williams v. St. Joseph Hosp., 629 F.2d 448, 453-54
(7th Cir. 1980) (analytical focus is on the nexus between interstate commerce and the challenged
activity).
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The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Stone v. William Beaumont
Hospital-'9 dealt with the staff privileges issue and Sherman Act jurisdiction. In Stone, a doctor alleged that denial of his application for
staff privileges at a Detroit area hospital constituted a violation of the
Sherman Act.3 0 The court of appeals, relying on the Supreme Court's
opinion in McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans,-, found that
the doctor had failed to establish a sufficient nexus with interstate
commerce .3 2 Since the hospital in Stone operated only locally, the
Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to
support an inference that defendant's activities can reasonably be expected to have a "not insubstantial effect" on interstate commerce. m
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Williams v. St. Joseph
Hospital,- set forth the general rule that medical practice per se is
a local activity.3 5 To bring a medical practice within reach of the
Sherman Act, a plaintiff must show a substantial and adverse effect
upon interstate commerce.3 6 The impact of defendants' professional
activities upon interstate commerce in medical supplies is a question
of fact. 7 Although the actual impact of a defendant's activities on
interstate commerce may be small, plaintiffs nonetheless must be able
to demonstrate a substantial effect on interstate commerce as a matter
of "practical economics."'
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Feminist Women's Center,
Inc. v. Mohammad,34upheld the substantial interstate commerce effect test, as did the Sixth Circuit in Sarin v. Samaritan Health

339. 782 F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1986).
340. Id. at 611. The gravamen of Stone's complaint was that defendants illegally excluded
him from using a local hospital two or three times a month.
341. Id. at 613 (quoting McLain, 444 U.S. at 242).
342. Stone, 782 F.2d at 613.
343. Id. (quoting Furlong v. Long Island College Hosp., 710 F.2d 922, 926 (2d Cir. 1983)).
344. 629 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1980).
345. Id. at 454.
346. Id. (citing Polhemus v. American Med. Ass'n, 145 F.2d 357, 359 (10th Cir. 1944)).
347. Id.
348. Id. (citing McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232 (1980). In
Justice Burger's words, "To establish federal jurisdiction in this case there remains only the
requirement that respondents' activities which allegedly have been infected by a price-fixing
conspiracy, be shown 'as a matter of practical economics' to have a not insubstantial effect on
the interstate commerce involved.").
349. 586 F.2d 530, 540-41 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979). A center which
maintained an abortion clinic brought an action against a physician, alleging federal and state
antitrust violations. The court held that travel of patients from other states to use the clinic's
services brought case within the jurisdictional scope of the Sherman Act.
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Center. 50 In Sarin, the court further refined the concept of a physician's impact on interstate commerce. The Sarin court held that a
physician must show that a hospital's denial of hospital privileges has
3 51
more than a de minimis effect on interstate commerce.
In HospitalBuilding Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 2 the Supreme
Court stated that an effect can be "substantial" under the Sherman
Act even if its interstate commerce impact falls far short of either
affecting market price or causing enterprise to fold.- The Court then
outlined what a plaintiff should allege in the complaint in order to
establish that the defendant's conduct had a "substantial effect" on
interstate commerce.- It is sufficient if a plaintiff alleges that defendant's activities will place "unreasonable burdens on the free and uninterrupted flow of interstate commerce."-' A plaintiff need not allege
that the defendant had the "purposeful goal of affecting interstate
commerce" or that "the conspiracy threaten[s] the demise of out-ofstate businesses."- Further, a plaintiff does not allege that the con357
spiracy affects market prices.
Since Hospital Building Co. and McLain, lower federal courts
have embarked upon an expanded interpretation of the Sherman Act's
jurisdictional interstate commerce requirement. Cardio-MedicalAssociation v. Crozer-ChesterMedical Center3s- is an example of this trend
toward an expanded interpretation of Sherman Act jurisdiction. In
Cardio-Medical, four cardiologists claimed that their denial of
specialized staff privileges, preventing them from using advanced
equipment at the defendant hospital, violated the Sherman Act.~'
Plaintiffs alleged that twelve to fifteen percent of their patients generated large annual revenues. 360 They also alleged large purchases of

350. 813 F.2d 755, 758 (6th Cir. 1987).
351. Id. Dr. Sarin, whose hospital privileges were revoked, was shown to have been performing, on the average, less than one operation per week at the Samaritan Health Center.
352. 425. U.S. 738 (1976).
353. Id. at 745.
354. Id. at 746.
355. Id. (quoting United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186, 189 (1954)).
356. See Tiger v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 560 F.2d 818, 826 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978) (plaintiff alleged that defendant attempted to monopolize waste
collection service in parts of both Indiana and Kentucky in violation of the Sherman Act § 2.
At issue was whether certain facts were sufficient to satisfy the "substantial effect" test at the
pleading stage of the proceeding).
357. 560 F.2d at 826.
358. 721 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1983).
359. Id. at 71.
360. Id. at 76.
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out-of-state medications.361 The court held that interferences with
interstate travel of patients, interstate payment of fees, and interstate
purchases of medical supplies demonstrated an effect on interstate
commerce. 362 The court concluded that the pleadings were adequate
363
to meet the jurisdictional requirements of the Sherman Act.
Federal courts have relied upon the broad language of Cardio-Medical to find that various factors may satisfy the Act's jurisdictional
requirement in the hospital context. These factors include the following: treatment of out-of-state patients; receipt of Medicare, Medicaid,
and out-of-state insurance funds; and purchase of medicine, equipment,
and medical supplies from out-of-state purveyors by the plaintiff doctor
or the defendant hospital. 364 Hospital credentials committees should
consider these Sherman Act jurisdictional factors before making a
decision that is likely to lead to litigation. Although federal courts
require a sufficient relationship with interstate commerce before jurisdiction exists, the present trend is to make the jurisdictional requirement easy to satisfy.
VI.

GOOD FAITH DECISIONS BY THE
MEDICAL PEER REVIEW COMMITTEE

The majority of states have statutes granting peer review immunity
for decisions made in "good faith." Good faith is an abstract quality
encompassing an honest belief, absence of malice, and absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage.3 States impose the good faith requirement in various ways. For example, the
Illinois Medical Practice Act provides immunity from civil liability for
medical review committee members unless their conduct is willful and
wanton. 3- Accordingly, an Illinois appeals court recently required a
plaintiff doctor who was denied staff privileges to show that the defendant medical review committee members acted willfully and wantonly. 67 Additionally, the court held that a proper charge of willful

361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. See Marrese v. Interqual, Inc., 748 F.2d 373, 382 (7th Cir. 1984) (includes extension
listing of similar cases involving denial or revocation of physician clinical privileges at hospitals);
see also Crowder v. Conlan, 740 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1984) (receipt of federal funds from Medicare
and Medicaid not adequate to establish an effect on interstate commerce).
365. See Efron v. Kalmanovitz, 249 Cal. App. 2d 187, 57 Cal. Rptr. 248, 251 (1967); Doyle
v. Gordon 158 N.Y.S.2d 248, 249, 260 (1914).
366. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, 4406 (1983).
367. See Adkins v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 158 Ill. App. 3d 982, 511 N.E.2d
1267 (Ill. App. 4th Dist. 1987).
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and malicious committee conduct must include a charge that the indi36
vidual defendant voted for the action with the requisite mental state. 8
Minnesota has gone one step further in dealing with good faith in
the peer review committee. The Minnesota peer review statute grants
''
immunity to peer review members unless they act with "malice. 369
Thus, in Campbell v. St. Mary's Hospital,370 the Supreme Court of

Minnesota held that the plaintiff's causes of action against hospital
peer review members for interference with business relationships,
defamation, and conspiracy could not stand in the absence of legal
malice. 371

372
The strong language of Florida's medical peer review statute
373
evidences the state's policy of encouraging peer review activities .
The Florida statute protects peer review members who act "without

intentional fraud. ''37- In addition, the statute prohibits the discovery

or introduction into evidence of peer review records in any civil action
against a peer review member. 376
The HCQIA adds further definition to the "good faith" require-

ment.376 In requires a "reasonable belief' that the action was in fur-

therance of quality health care 77 and a reasonable effort to obtain the
pertinent facts. 378 The HCQIA also requires a reasonable belief that

the action was warranted by the facts known after such reasonable
379
effort to obtain facts.

Other states choose to deal with good faith from a perspective
more akin to that of due process. The Wisconsin peer review statute,
for example, provides that persons who act in good faith while participating in the peer review process are not liable for any civil damages
for their peer review actions.- ° To determine whether a member acted
in good faith, the statute requires the court to consider several factors.
These include whether the member sought to prevent the health facility from examining peer review records, presenting witnesses, estab-

368.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.

Id. at 988, 511 N.E.2d at 1272.
1987 MINN. LAWS § 145.63.
312 Minn. 379, 252 N.W.2d 581 (1977).
Id. at 389, 252 N.W.2d at 587.
FLA. STAT. § 766.101.
See Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1984).
FLA. STAT. § 766.101(3)(a).
Id. § 766.101(5).
42 U.S.C. § 11112 (1986).
Id. § 11112(a)(2).

378.

Id.

379.
380.

Id. § 11112(a)(4).
1982 Wis. Laws 146.37 (2).

369.
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lishing pertinent facts, cross-examining adverse witnesses or receiving
a copy of the review committee's final recommendation. 38,
While this type of peer review statute may provide some immunity
absent a showing of bad faith, it does little to define bad faith. Instead,
it focuses on the committee satisfying due process-type procedural
requirements. Thus, an aggrieved party accorded due process could
not sue members of the reviewing organization despite any bad faith
conduct on their part. It is unlikely that any legislative body would
have intended such a result. Nevertheless, under a liberal interpretation of a Wisconsin-type peer review statute, due process in the peer
review process would suffice for "good faith" action by the committee.
In Carida v. Holy Cross Hospital, Inc.,3 2 a Florida court sought
to reconcile the "good faith, without malice" statutory standard 383 with
a due process complaint of arbitrary and capricious peer review decisionmaking. 384 The Caridacourt chose to limit "liability" as restricted
in the statute to those damages proximately resulting from a tort.3
The court was careful, however, not to foreclose the plaintiffs due
process rights.
The Carida court sought to protect peer review members from
civil liability according to the statutory mandate while at the same
time protecting the procedural due process right of a peer review
applicant. Likewise, the HCQIA and the Patrickdecision should stimulate state legislatures to examine these dual protections in light of
reconsidering their medical peer review immunity statutes and the

381. Id.
382. 427 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983).
383. FLA STAT. § 395.0653(3) (1981) provides in pertinent part that "[t]here shall be no
liability on the part of, and no cause of action of any nature shall arise against, any hospital.
• .for any action taken in good faith and without malice (in conducting peer review pursuant
to Florida law)."
384. Carida,427 So. 2d at 803.
385. Id. at 806 n.6.
386. Id. The court stated:
Were we to construe this subsection as completely eliminating any cause of action
of any nature against a hospital which gave such inadequate notice of the reasons
reappointment was not being recommended, but without malice, then any determinative hearing could be notwithstanding the physician's substantial inability to
prepare therefor. Similarly, any arbitrary and capricious, but not malicious action
taken upon an application for reappointment would go totally unanswered.
Id. at 806 n.6.
The court relied upon Article I, § 21 of the Florida Constitution which provides: "The courts
shall be open to every person for redress of any injury ...."
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qualifying requirements of the medical peer review committee. At
least two states are already considering changes in their medical prac7
tice acts.3
VII.

DUE PROCESS FOR THE AGGRIEVED PHYSICIAN 8 8

The modern view of procedural due process is typified in Bowens
v. North Carolina Department of Human Resources.389 The Bowens
plaintiff, a dentist and Medicaid provider, was denied continuing participation in the Medicaid program. 390 Plaintiff brought suit against
the North Carolina Department of Human Resources for violating his
fourteenth amendment due process rights. 391 In various Supreme Court
procedural due process cases, the Court reiterated that at minimum,
due process usually requires adequate notice of charges and fair opportunity to meet them. 392 In addition, the particulars of notice and hearing
must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are
to be heard.- Finding that the state agency had afforded plaintiff
adequate notice and opportunity for hearing, the court affirmed the
39
lower court's summary judgment for the agency. 4
The federal district court in Jerico v. Coffeyville Memorial Hospital39 applied the due process concept in the area of medical peer
review. 396 The Jerico court held that an anesthesiologist who was demoted without a hearing in violation of the hospital's bylaws was

387. California, anticipating the Supreme Court's decision in Patrick v. Burget, actually
started drafting and refining SB 2565 a year ago. Closely modeled on the federal HCQIA, the
bill also would grant M.D.s who participate in peer review limited immunity from antitrust
liability as long as certain, fair procedures are followed. Washington state, in the wake of
Patrick, is drafting newly remodeled medical peer review statutes.
388. Due process of law first entered into American jurisprudence in the fifth amendment
to the United States Constitution which provides that "nor [shall any person] be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ..
" U.S. CONST. amend. V. This phrase
was made applicable to the states with the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, § 1, which
states that "[n]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. "Due process" does not have a fixed meaning but
expands with jurisprudential attitudes of fundamental fairness. Palko v. State, 302 U.S. 319
(1937).
389. 710 F.2d 1015 (4th Cir. 1983).
390. Id. at 1017.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 1019. See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970).
393. Id.
394.
395.

Id. at 1021.
628 F. Supp. 329 (D. Kan. 1985).

396. Id.
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entitled to bring suit against a city-owned hospital.3 97 Even though
the physician was not denied privileges, the change of status occurred
39
in a way contrary to the bylaws which the medical staff had adopted. 8
In Marrese v. Interqual, Inc., 399 the Seventh Circuit held that a
physician denied continuing hospital privileges was entitled to a hearing and a review before the hospital peer review committee. 4°° The
court noted that plaintiff was also entitled to judicial review of the
hospital's decision.40, The court held that in light of the hospital's fair
hearing procedures and the availability of judicial review of the hospital's decision, the plaintiff had a more than adequate forum to challenge
4
the defendants' conduct. 02
In Ramirez v. Ahn, 403 the Fifth Circuit considered the procedural
due process claim of an obstetrician whose medical license was revoked
by the Texas State Board of Medical Examiners. 4°4 The court explained
that the due process clause requires procedure at a level appropriate
to the nature of the case. 405 According to the court, the level of procedural due process required of an administrative body is determined
by balancing the individual's property interest against the government's interest in efficient administration.- ° The court determined
that the state license revocation hearing need not be ideal for the
obstetrician to receive constitutionally required procedural due pro4
cess . 07
Having established that physicians denied hospital privileges are
entitled to procedural due process, the next issue is to determine the
process due. 408 The standard of procedural due process is an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."9
Many states have addressed the issue of fair hearing and notice. Texas,
for example, in its Medical Practice Act sets forth guidelines for both

397.

Id. at 333.

398. Id.
399. .748 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985).
400. Id. at 393.

401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
(1950).
406.

Id.
Id.
843 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1545 (1989).
Id.
Id. at 868; see also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313
843 F.2d at 868.

407. Id. at 869.

408.
409.

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
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"notice" and "hearing" in medical license suspension or revocation
cases.410
411
The HCQIA discusses standards for professional review actions.
The HCQIA prescribes a number of notice procedures that health care
facilities must meet. 412 The physicians must be given notice stating

that a professional review action against the physician has been proposed 13 and the reasons for the proposed action.' 14 In addition, the

physician must be notified of the thirty day time limit to request a
15
hearing on the proposed action. '

A physician's hearing rights include the right to call, examine, and
cross-examine witnesses,'4 6 to present relevant evidence,"' 7 and to sub-

mit a written statement at the close of the hearing.' 8 Upon completion
of the hearing, the physician involved has the right to receive the
written recommendation of the arbitrator, officer or panel, including
a statement of the basis for the recommendations.'

19

In addition, the

physician has the right to receive a written decision of the health care
entity, including a statement of the basis of the decision.tm A professional review action is presumed to meet the preceding standards
unless the presumption is rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence. 2'

410. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 3.01(h) (Vernon 1988).
411. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(b).
412. Id.
413. Id. § 11112(b)(1)(A)(i).
414. Id. § 11112(b)(1)(A)(ii).
415. Id. § 11112(b)(1)(B)(i). If a hearing is requested on a timely basis, the hearing shall
be held in several different ways, as determined by the health care entity. Id. § 11112(b)(3)(A).
The hearing shall be held before an arbitrator who is mutually acceptable to the physician and
the health care entity. Id. § 11112(b)(3)(A)(i). The hearing may also be held before a hearing
officer appointed by the entity who is not in direct economic competition with the physician
involved or before a panel of individuals who are appointed by the entity and are not in direct
economic competition with the physicians involved. Id. § 11112(b)(3)(A)(ii) and id. §
11112(b)(3)(A)(iii). The right to the hearing may be forfeited if the physician falls, without good
cause, to appear. Id. § 11112(b)(3)(B). During the hearing, the physician has the right to
representation by an attorney. Id. § 11112(b)(3)(C)(i). The physician also has the right to have
a record made of the proceedings and the right to receive a copy of the record. Id. §
llll2(b)(3)(C)(ii).
416. Id. § 11112(b)(3)(C)(iii).
417. Id. § 11112(b)(3)(C)(iv) (hearing officer determines the relevancy of the evidence regardless of its admissibility in a court of law).
418. Id. § 11112(b)(3)(C)(v).
419. Id. § 11112(b)(3)(D)(i).
420. Id. § 11112(b)(3)(D)(ii).
421. Id. § 11112(a).
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Hearings conducted by hospital medical peer review committees
which involve negative decisions about physicians' privileges should
be attended by counsel to insure that the proper procedures are followed according to hospital bylaws. If the bylaws are lacking in the
procedural due process area, then counsel should assist in amending
them. Guidelines are now clearly delineated in the HCQIA. Without
them, members of the medical peer review committee may find their
presumed immunity nonexistent.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Whether medical peer review immunity exists after Patrick is an
open issue. Since physicians are reluctant to rely on an untested immunity law, they hesitate to serve on professional peer review committees at a time when governmental regulatory agencies are demanding
more rigorous quality assurance. Generally, doctors agree that medical
peer review is a worthwhile and necessary activity. In the wake of
Patrick, however, fewer physicians are willing to serve on peer review
boards without some assurance of immunity for their good faith peer
review action.
Statutory relief is the obvious first step. State medical associations
are likely to begin working with their legislators in an attempt to
refine the present medical peer review immunity statutes. In addition,
the AMA should work with Congress to strengthen the weak parts
in the HCQIA.
The AMA and the JCAH have taken a conciliatory position toward
Patrickin an attempt to dissuade physicians from avoiding peer review
activities. The AMA general counsel has said "that while the decision
was disappointing, physicians should be told that there is no significant
risk of antitrust liability for peer review done in good faith." 4 - Other
prominent legal experts believe that the new federal law greatly protects physicians who engage in proper peer review procedures from
the threat of antitrust suits. 42 The JCAH Vice President of Education
urged physicians not to give up on the law and abandon peer review
activities: "They must understand that Patrickand HCQIA both stand
for the principles that MD's must be 'crystal clean about keeping
economics out' of peer review and that they must strictly follow due
process rules. '' 4- An AMA attorney reported that no cases had been

422.
1988, at
423.
424.

O'Brien, Supreme Court Reverses Patrick, AMERICAN MEDICAL NEWS, May 27,
18.
Id.
Id.
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found in which physicians had successfully sued other physicians in
the context of good faith peer review following proper procedures.425
Obvious deficiencies are likely to be found in most states' medical
peer review statutes under the Patrick standards. Hospitals which
operate in large metropolitan areas in close proximity to other similar
hospitals may feel protected from application of the Sherman Act.
However, hospitals in smaller communities should reevaluate their
monopoly position and its impact on medical practitioners whose
privileges are denied or revoked.
The Eleventh Circuit determined that judicial review may, under
certain circumstances, qualify for active state supervision. 426 This holding is likely to guide state legislatures in undertaking to remedy the
lack of medical review immunity found by the Patrick Court.
Section 1983 claims after Patrick will probably increase due to
states' increased "active supervision" of medical peer review committees under the state action doctrine. As state legislatures create active
supervision of regulatory medical boards, a sufficient nexus to qualify
for a section 1983 claim may be created.
A paradox exists in the courts' diverse attitudes toward subject
matter jurisdiction and the state action doctrine in civil rights actions.
The modern trend in pleading jurisdiction is for courts to allow any
out-of-state patient traffic, purchasing of medical supplies or receipt
of federal funds to meet the jurisdictional "substantially affecting"
interstate commerce test. Yet, courts find virtually the same factors
to be an insufficient nexus between hospital peer review committees
and the state to properly plead state action.
Bad faith decisions by members of the professional review committee have never been protected. However, complex litigation procedural
schemes may overwhelm committee decisions made in good faith. For
example, the Ninth Circuit noted that the peer review process in
42
Patrick involved shabby, unprincipled, and unprofessional conduct. 7
Yet the Supreme Court did not ostensibly decide Patrick on the basis
42
of the committee's bad faith.
Following Patrick, physicians are acutely aware that even good
faith decisions do not protect them from potential litigation. Due process, after Patrick, because of the adverse impact of peer review
decisions on a physician's career should become more closely defined.
Accordingly, due process should at least provide a physician the right
to have an attorney present during peer review hearings.
425.
426.
427.
428.

Id. Case review in this article reveals that this statement should be viewed with caution.
Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., 851 F.2d 1273 (l1th Cir. 1988).
Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498, 1509 (9th Cir. 1986).
Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988).
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Doctors have reacted ambivalently to the Patrick decision. On the
one hand, they want the advice and protection of an attorney during
the quasi-legal process of professional peer review. However, doctors
are reluctant to create in the committee room an adversarial environment which an attorney's presence might cause. Lawyers are simultaneously attempting to define more closely how to quantitatively
measure the quality of medical care. With one mighty stroke of the
pen, the Supreme Court of the United States has created a system
whereby doctors are spending an inordinate amount of time worrying
about how to practice law and lawyers are busily trying to determine
how to practice medicine.

